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I. Introduction 
 
My remarks today relate to the “Financing of American Higher Education Institutions 
in the 21st Century”. Although the discussion has some implications for the ability of 
students and their families to finance college educations, my focus is on institutions of 
higher education, not on students.  I will begin by discussing the growing resource 
imbalance that is emerging between public and private institutions and then the growing 
inequality of resources across institutions that is occurring within each of the public and 
private sectors. As I do this, I will illustrate the implications of some of these changes for 
the patterns of faculty compensation and faculty turnover that we observe across 
academic institutions. 
I will then turn to a discussion of the growing importance of scientific research to 
universities and the growing costs that universities are incurring for this research. The 
enormous costs of scientific research are increasingly being born by the institutions 
themselves and institutions need to understand who actually bears the burden of these 
costs. Institutions increasingly are hoping that they will generate revenue to support their 
research enterprise through the commercialization of their faculty members’ research 
findings, but I shall show that currently very few institutions are generating substantial 
funding from their commercialization activities.  
 Finally, if time permits, I will conclude with some speculations about the 
directions in which our American higher education system will evolve over the next few 
decades and what some of the major financial issues facing academic institutions will 
prove to be. Much of my discussion draws on research that I have been conducting jointly 
with a wonderful group of undergraduate and graduate students associated with the 
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Cornell Higher Education Research Institute and my great debt to them for help in 
preparing these remarks will be obvious to you. 
II. Starving the Majority 
Throughout the past 40 years, roughly 75% of all students enrolled in American 
colleges and universities and 66% of all students enrolled in 4-year institutions have been 
enrolled in public institutions. If one focuses on full-time equivalent enrollments, each of 
these numbers falls by at most one or two percentage points. Put simply, the vast majority 
of American college students attend public higher education institutions and thus what is 
happening to public higher education is much more important to our nation’s well-being 
than what is happening to selective private colleges and universities. Current state budget 
problems brought on by the aftermath of September 11, the recession and the reduction 
by many states in state tax rates during the 1990s by more than was prudent have 
exacerbated the problems that public higher education institutions are facing. 
Figure 1 displays all level of education’s average share of total state expenditures 
during the 1974 to 2002 period. Census data suggests that education’s share declined 
from 35.2% in FY1973 to 29.6% in FY1994, before rising back to about 32% in FY1998. 
Data from the National Association of State Budget Officers, which reports higher 
education shares, suggests that education’s share in FY2002 was about the same as its 
share in FY1998. There is nothing sacrosanct about education’s share and we are all 
familiar with the forces responsible for its decline over the last 30 years – increased 
pressure for expenditures on Medicaid, welfare and criminal justice and corrections.  
What is less well known and is displayed in Figure 2 is that the average share of state 
education budgets that has been allocated to higher education has declined for most of the 
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period. After peaking at 22.5% in FY1983, higher education’s share of state education 
budgets declined to 16.8% in FY1999. A different data source, which reports slightly 
higher shares, indicates that higher education’s share continued to decline after FY1999. 
The major components of state higher education budgets are appropriations to public 
higher education institutions and the provision of need based and non-need based grant 
aid to students. As figure 3 displays, since the 1976-77 academic year the share of state 
higher education expenditures out of states’ general funds going directly to students in 
the form of need based and non-need based financial aid has more than doubled, rising 
from 2.8% in FY1977 to 6.0% in FY2001. Hence, the share of appropriations to public 
higher education institutions in state education budgets is declining even more rapidly 
than figure 2 suggests. Put simply, state appropriations to higher education institutions 
are a declining share of state expenditures on education, which itself is a declining share 
of the state budgets. 
Explaining the changes described in these three figures and, more importantly, the 
wide variation across states in the measures described in each figure is the subject of 
Michael Rizzo’s Cornell Ph.D. dissertation in progress, “State Funding for Education: 
Why Public Higher Education Institutions Have Lost”. What I want to emphasize here is 
simply that these changes might lead one to expect that state appropriations per student to 
higher education institutions probably did not increased substantially over the period and 
this expectation is correct. 
  Figure 4 displays the average real (in 2000 dollars) state appropriations per student 
in public higher education institutions from FY1974 to FY2000. During the period per 
FTE student appropriations grew in real terms by about 24% from $4,042 to $5,004. This 
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overall growth includes a period of decline that took place in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. While the overall rate of growth in state appropriations per student was 23.8% 
during the period, the cumulative annual average growth rate was only 0.8% a year. 
Institutions’ sources of revenue differ in public and private higher education. 
Simplifying greatly and ignoring funding for research expenditures, which I will return to 
in the second part of my talk, expenditures per student in private higher education are 
driven primarily by tuition levels and external gifts and endowment income, while 
expenditures per student in public higher education are driven primarily by tuition levels 
and state appropriations per student.  
Viewed in terms of real (2002) dollars, the average tuition and fees at private four-
year institutions grew by 229% during the 1971-72 to 2002-03 period, an annual rate of 
growth of 2.7%. Average tuition and fees at public four-year institutions grew by 248%, 
an annual growth rate of 2.9%. So during the past 31 years tuition and fees have grown at 
a slightly higher rate in the public sector than in the private sector. However, where an 
institution starts matters and the slightly higher growth rate for public institutions in no 
way compensated for their much lower initial average level of tuition and fees ($1,646 
versus $7,966). As a result, viewed in terms of 2001-2002 dollars, the difference between 
the average private and average public four-year institution’s tuition and fees, which was 
$6320 in 1972-73, more than doubled to $14,192 in 2002-2003.  Put another way, private 
institutions gained much more in terms of absolute dollars per student from raising tuition 
than their public institutions counterparts did during the period.1 
                                                 
1 The pattern for 2-year institutions was similar. The average annual growth rate of tuition and fees at the 
publics during the period, 2.4% exceeded the average annual growth rate of tuition and fees at the privates, 
2.1%. Even so, in real terms the absolute gap in real tuition and fees between the privates and the publics 
almost doubled from $4,289 to $8,165 
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Given the slow rate of growth of state appropriations per student at the publics, which 
was the driving force that led to much of the public institutions’ tuition increases, it 
should not be surprising to you that between 1970-71 and 1995-96, real current 
expenditures per student at 4-year institutions grew at a faster rate, 43%, in the private 
sector than it did in the public sector, 34%.2 As a result, while the difference in real terms 
between the two sectors in expenditure per student was about $4,700 in 1970-71, by 
1995-96 it had reached over $8,000.  Private institutions increasingly have more 
resources to spend per student than public higher education institutions have. 
Faculty members’ salaries represent a major use of academic institution’s current 
revenues. A number of researchers, including me, have used data from the annual AAUP 
survey of faculty salaries to document that faculty salaries of faculty in public academic 
institutions have fallen relative to the salaries of faculty at private academic institutions 
since 1978-79.3 The decline has been largest for doctoral level institutions and for faculty 
in senior ranks. For example, the ratio of average salaries of full professors in public 
doctoral level institutions to the average salaries of full professors in private doctoral 
level institutions fell from about .91 in 1978-79 to .79 in 1993-94. 
 As state appropriations per student began to increase in real terms in the mid 1990s 
(figure 4), the ratio then remained roughly constant through 2001-2002. However, state 
appropriations per student fell in real terms in fiscal year 2002-2003; thirteen states 
actually cut their appropriations to higher education in current dollar terms this past year.4 
It should come as no surprise to you then that this year’s annual AAUP salary report that 
                                                 
2 U.S. Department of Education (2002), table 343. 
3 F. King Alexander (2001), Ronald G. Ehrenberg (2000, 2003a, 2003b), Daniel Hamermesh (2002), 
Cynthia Zoghi (2003) 
4 Michael Arnone (2002) 
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I authored, which will be published on April 9, will indicate that the salaries of faculty at 
public doctoral institutions had fallen relative to those of their counterparts at private 
doctoral institutions by another 1 to 2 percentage points this year.5 
 The decline in the ratio of public academic institutions’ faculty members’ salaries 
to private academic institutions’ faculty members’ salaries that has taken place likely 
makes it more difficult for the public institutions to hire and retain top faculty, especially 
at the senior level. However, while anecdotal stories about public academic institutions 
being “raided” by private academic institutions for tenured faculty members can be 
found, there has been little systematic evidence to confirm that this is occurring.6 
 Each year the annual AAUP salary survey collects (but does not publish) 
institutional level data on the number of continuing faculty members. Continuing faculty 
members in a rank are defined as full-time faculty members employed in the rank in the 
previous year that are also employed by the institution in the current year, regardless of 
their rank in the current year. So for example, a faculty member who was an associate 
professor last year and is promoted to full professor this year is counted as a continuing 
associate professor this year. Information that is reported by institutions on the numbers 
of continuing faculty members in each rank and these faculty members’ total salaries in 
both the previous and current year are used by the AAUP to compute the estimates of 
average salary increases for continuing faculty that appear in Academe each year. 
Subject to some qualifications, information on the number of continuing faculty 
members at an institution in a rank one year, coupled with information on the number of 
faculty members at the institution in the rank the previous year, permits one to compute a 
                                                 
5 Ronald G. Ehrenberg (2003b) 
6 Scott Smallwood (2001) 
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continuation rate for faculty members in each rank at the institution. This is done by 
dividing the number of continuing faculty members in the rank one year by the total 
number of faculty members in the rank in the previous year.7 The continuation rate, or 
more precisely one minus the continuation rate, is a measure of faculty turnover from 
year to year in the rank. 
The continuation rate cannot be used as a measure of voluntary turnover for assistant 
professors because some assistant professors leaving an institution do so involuntarily 
when they are turned down for tenure. Similarly, the continuation rate for full professors 
is “contaminated” by faculty departures due to retirement, disability or death. The 
continuation rate for associate professors, most of who are tenured faculty members, 
comes closest to approximating a measure of voluntary turnover that is likely to be 
influenced by average salaries at an institution. 
Over a decade ago, Herschel Kasper, Daniel Rees and I used institutional level 
information on continuation rates for the 1988-89 academic year from the AAUP to 
analyze the relationship between an institution’s associate professors’ continuation rate 
and its average associate professors’ salary.8 We found, other factors held constant, that 
institutions with higher average salaries tended to have higher continuation rates (lower 
voluntary turnover rates) than their competitors. Moreover the magnitude of this 
relationship was largest for the AAUP doctoral university category. Recently, Cornell 
undergraduate Matthew Nagowski and I replicated these analyses, using data for the 
1996-97 to 2002-2003 period. We again found that higher average salaries are associated 
                                                 
7 These qualifications relate to the treatment of faculty who are serving as administrators or who are on 
leave in either the current or previous year. The presence of such individuals introduces possible 
measurement error into the continuation rate calculation. 
8  Ehrenberg, Kasper and Rees (1991). 
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with higher continuation rates, other factors held constant.9  So given the pattern of 
public/private salary differentials that has existed recent years, it is reasonable to expect 
that we would observe that private higher education institutions would have higher 
average associate professor continuation rates, and thus lower voluntary turnover rates, 
than their public counterparts during the period. 
Figure 5 plots the weighted (by faculty size) average associate professor continuation 
rates for a sample of 57 doctoral institutions that reported continuing faculty data for each 
year during the 1996-97 to 2001-2002 period to the AAUP.  The average continuation 
rate for private doctoral institutions was always greater than that for their public 
counterparts. Using a larger sample consisting of all of the doctoral institutions that 
reported continuing faculty data in any year during the period yielded similar results.  
While one cannot infer causation from these simple comparisons, they do suggest that 
one cost to public higher education institutions of having lower faculty salaries than their 
private competitors is higher voluntary turnover of their tenured faculty. 
III. Growing Inequality 
 
While it is well known that the ratio of average faculty salaries at public higher 
education to average faculty salaries at private higher education institutions has fallen, 
what is less recognized is that within each of the public and private higher education 
sectors, an increase in the dispersion of average faculty salaries has taken place. Figure 6  
plots the variance of the logarithm of average real (constant dollar) full professor salaries 
across doctoral level institutions at 5-year intervals between 1962-63 and 2001-2002 for a 
sample of 96 institutions that reported data in every year.10  The variance of the logarithm 
                                                 
9 Nagowski and Ehrenberg (2003) 
10 Using a larger sample of all institutions that reported data in any year yields similar results. 
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of average salaries is a measure of dispersion that is invariant to the nominal level of 
salaries. For example, if each institution doubled its average faculty salary, the variance 
of the logarithm of average faculty salary would remain constant.  
As the figure indicates, the dispersion of average full professor salaries across these 
institutions decreased in both the public and private institution samples between the early 
1960s and late 1970s but has increased fairly steadily ever since. Similar patterns are 
present for associate and assistant professors. Moreover, this increasing dispersion is not 
confined to the doctoral institutions. Figure 7 presents similar data for the variances in the 
logarithms of average faculty salaries by rank for a set of private bachelor’s colleges that 
reported average salary data each sample year. Again, starting in the mid to late 1970s, 
the dispersion across institutions in the logarithm of average faculty salaries increased for 
all ranks, with the increase being the greatest at the senior levels. 
In research summarized elsewhere, Cornell graduate student Andrew Nutting and I 
have estimated logarithm of average faculty salary equations by rank separately for 
public and private doctoral institutions and private bachelor’s institutions using panel 
data for the 1972-73 to 1997-98 period.11 The explanatory variables included in our 
analyses were endowment per student, tuition and state appropriations per student, as 
well as a set of institution specific dichotomous variables. The inclusion of the latter 
variables makes what we did equivalent to specifying that the change in the logarithm of 
average faculty salary at an institution is a function of the change in endowment per 
student at the institution, the change in tuition at the institution and the change in state 
appropriations per student at the institution. We then use these estimates to understand 
                                                 
11 Ehrenberg (2003a) 
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which factors have been responsible for the growing dispersion in faculty salaries across 
institutions. 
Our models attribute the vast majority of the growing dispersion in average faculty 
salaries across private doctoral institutions and across private bachelor’s institutions at 
each rank to the growing dispersion of endowment wealth that took place during the 
period. To understand why this is true, it is important to realize that even if two 
institutions experienced the same percentage increase in endowment per student during a 
period, the institution that had the highest initial level of endowment per student will gain 
more absolutely in endowment per student than the institution with the lower initial level 
of endowment per student. If other sources of institutional income, such as tuition were 
growing at rates that were lower in percentage terms than the rate at which endowment 
were growing, the institution with the largest initial endowment per student would see its 
total income per student grow by a larger percentage than its relatively poorer 
counterpart. Thus it would be able to increase its average faculty salary level by a greater 
percentage during the period.  
Our estimates suggest that the growing variance of the logarithm of average faculty 
salaries at each rank for public doctoral institutions is due both to growing differences in 
endowment per student and growing differences in state appropriations per student. 
However for all three ranks, changes in endowment per student played at best a minor 
role. Most of the increase in the variances of the logarithms of average real faculty 
salaries across public doctoral institutions is due to the growing differences in the rates of 
growth of state appropriations per student across institutions. Indeed, at the assistant and 
the associate professor levels, virtually all of the growth in the dispersion of average 
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faculty salaries can be explained by growing differences in the level of state 
appropriations per student across institutions. 
The increased dispersion of average faculty salaries across institutions in both the 
public and private sectors parallels the increases in income inequality that are occurring 
more broadly in American society. They further suggest that it is probably becoming 
increasingly difficult for some institutions in both sectors to attract and retain high quality 
faculty. Numerous studies have suggested that where students go to college significantly 
influences their future earnings.12 If faculty quality now differs more across institutions 
than it did in the past, where students choose to go to college may matter even more in 
the future than it has in the past.  
IV. The Growing Cost of Science 
 
Scientific research has come to dominate many American university campuses. The 
growing importance of science to our society has been accompanied by a growing flow of 
funds to universities from the federal and state governments, corporations and 
foundations to support research. As a result, viewed in terms of 1998 dollars, the 
weighted (by faculty size) average volume of total research and development 
expenditures per faculty member across 228 American research and doctoral universities 
increased from about $70,000 per full-time professorial faculty member in 1970-71 to 
$142,340 per full-time professorial faculty member in 1999-2000.13 
                                                 
12 See for example, Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg (1999) and Eide, Brewer and Ehrenberg (1999) who find 
that differences in early career earnings and probabilities of enrolling in graduate school that are associated, 
other factors held constant, with the average SAT score of students at an institution and Dale and Kruger 
(2002) who conclude that students who attend institutions that have higher expenditures per student have 
higher post college earnings than other students. 
13 These figures and the ones that follow immediately are all computed from the NSF WEBCASPAR 
system (http://caspar.nsf.gov). Professorial faculty include assistant, associate and full professors. 
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What is not well recognized, however, is that in spite of the generous external support 
that has been provided to universities for research, increasingly the costs of research are 
being borne by the universities themselves. During the 1970-71 to 1999-2000 period, the 
weighted average of institutional expenditures on research per full-time professorial 
faculty member at the 228 universities more than tripled. As a result the weighted 
average percentage of universities’ total research expenditures being financed out of 
internal funds rose from about 11 to 20 percent during the period. Increasingly academic 
institutions themselves are bearing a greater share of the ever-increasing costs of 
scientific research. 
There are a number of forces that have led to the costs of research being borne by 
universities to soar over the past few decades.14 Theoretical scientists, who in a previous 
generation required only desks and pencils and papers, now often require 
supercomputers. Experimental scientists increasingly rely on sophisticated laboratory 
facilities that are increasingly expensive to build and operate. Research administration 
now includes strict monitoring of financial records and environmental safety, as well as 
the detailed review and monitoring of human subjects. At the same time that these 
research administration costs were increasing, the average indirect cost rate at private 
research and doctoral universities, which was over 60% in 1983, fell to about 55% in 
1997 and has remained near that level since then (Ehrenberg 2000, 2003).15 So, on 
                                                 
14 Ehrenberg (2000) discusses these forces in much more detail. 
15 Average indirect cost rates are lower at public research universities than they are at privates. This does 
not imply that the publics spend less on research infrastructure and administration than their private 
counterparts do. Rather much of the funding that the publics receive for infrastructure comes from the 
states in the form of financial support for buildings and the states often do not require their public 
universities to recoup these costs in indirect cost recoveries and then reimburse the state governments for 
them. Inasmuch as faculty members believe that high indirect cost rates result in a reduction in the 
probability that they will win grants and/or a reduction in the magnitudes of the amount of direct costs that 
they can apply for, the faculty puts pressure on public university administrators to keep their indirect cost 
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average, for any given level of direct cost funding that their faculty members received, 
private universities received 8.3% less funds from the federal government to support their 
research infrastructure and administration costs in the late 1990s than they did in the early 
1980s. In recent years the federal government has also placed increasing pressure on 
universities to provide “matching” institutional funds for any research proposals that they 
submit. 
Finally, as scientists’ equipment became more expensive and the competition for top-
quality scientists intensified, the start-up funding that universities needed to provide to 
attract both young and senior scientists intensified. Universities typically cannot recover 
these expenses in their indirect cost billings, because new young scientists rarely have 
their own external funding when they first arrive at a university. During the late 1990s, it 
was often alleged, although no systematic data existed to support this claim that the 
universities were providing young scientists in the range of $250,000 to $500,000 to set 
up their labs. The start-up costs of attracting distinguished senior scientists was often 
alleged to be much greater and even if these scientists brought their own federally funded 
research grants with them, their start-up costs too were often not recoverable in indirect 
cost recovery pools because the institutions faced caps on their recoveries in a number of 
categories. 
Because no systematic data on start-up costs has previously been collected, the 
Cornell Higher Education Research Institute conducted a Survey of Start- Up Costs and 
Laboratory Space Allocation Rules during the late spring and summer of 2002.16  Three 
                                                                                                                                                 
rates low. The administrators have tended to oblige them but as state support for public higher education 
tightened in the 1990s, many publics allowed their indirect cost rates to float up a bit. 
16 Laboratory space allocation rules were also a focus of the survey because many scientists and engineers 
are approaching ages when they might consider retiring and the promise of being able to keep their labs 
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to six science and engineering departments were identified at each of the 222 universities 
classified as research and doctoral universities in the 1994 Carnegie Foundation 
classification of academic institutions (Carnegie Foundation 1994). Separate surveys 
were sent to the chairs of each department, the deans of the colleges in which each of 
these departments were located and the vice president/vice provost for research in each 
university.  
In total 1031 chairs, 408 deans and 206 vice presidents/vice provosts received copies 
of the surveys. Usable responses were received from 572 (55%) of the chairs, 216 (53%) 
of the deans and 85 (38%) of the vice provosts/vice presidents.17 In what follows, I 
briefly summarize some of what we learned about start-up costs from the three surveys. 
Copies of the three survey questionnaires and tabulations of the responses to each 
question from each survey, cross-tabulated by Carnegie Category and form of control 
(public/private) are available on the CHERI web site (http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/cheri). 
 At the new assistant professor level, with few exceptions, Carnegie Research I 
universities provided large start-up packages than other universities and private 
universities provided larger start-up packages than public universities. Table 1 
summarizes some of the differences we found, when the respondents are broken down 
into four broad fields - physics/astronomy, biology, chemistry and engineering. The 
average assistant professor start up package at Research I universities varied across fields 
from a low of $337,000 in engineering to a high of just over $475,000 dollars in 
chemistry. Estimates of the average high-end (most expensive) assistant professor start-
                                                                                                                                                 
after retirement may be a powerful tool to encourage them to retire. Such promises, however, are also very 
costly.  
17 The response rates to the survey varied across type of institution. In particular, response rates were higher 
for departments and deans associated with public institutions than from those associated with private 
institutions. 
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up packages at these institutions varied across fields from $416,875 in engineering to 
$580,000 in chemistry. 
 Start-up cost packages for senior faculty members are considerably larger. For 
example, again in the private Research I universities, the average start-up cost package 
ranged from about $570,000 in Physics to $1.5 million in engineering; the comparable 
range for the average high-end senior faculty start-up cost package at private Research I 
universities ranged from $1.0 million in physics to $1.8 million in engineering. The 
average high-end senior faculty start-up cost package was larger in two fields (physics 
and chemistry) at public Research I universities than it was at private Research I 
universities, this may reflect efforts by a number of the publics to move their departments 
to a higher level by hiring a few key senior faculty members. 
 Estimates of average start-up cost packages provided by the deans who responded 
to our survey were similar to those provided by the chairs. Where the deans probably 
were better informed than the chairs, however, was on the sources of start-up funds. On 
average, deans reported that the largest source of start-up cost funds was the general 
budgets of the college and university, with 45% of start-up costs coming from these 
sources. Deans reported that of the remaining 55%, 20% came from sources other than 
keeping positions vacant (and thus using budgeted salary dollars), endowment income 
and gifts, state appropriations, and the operating budgets of their departments. In notes 
that often accompanied their answers, they often indicated that the “other sources” were 
indirect cost recoveries. As we noted above, unless new faculty members bring external 
research funding with them, most start-up costs cannot be included in the indirect cost 
base. So what the deans really mean is that their universities incur expenses from their 
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general budgets for research administration and infrastructure and when these costs are 
reimbursed through the indirect cost pool, this permits the universities to spend funds 
from their own general budgets on start-up costs. 
 One point of concern is the extent to which institutions generate start-up costs by 
keeping faculty positions vacant. Deans at public institutions reported that they generated 
a greater percentage (13%) of their start-up cost funding from keeping positions vacant 
than deans at private universities did (7%). Hence the need to generate start-up cost 
funding appears to adversely influence the teaching programs of public universities more 
than it does the teaching programs of private universities. 
 This leads more broadly to the question of who actually bears the costs of the 
increased expenditures that universities are making out of institutional funds for research. 
In research in progress, Michael Rizzo, my faculty colleague George Jakubson and I are 
analyzing the extent to which increased research expenditures of out of internal 
institutional funds are associated with higher student/faculty ratios, lower rates of faculty 
salary growth or higher rates of tuition growth, holding constant all other sources of 
revenue coming into the university (including state appropriations, endowment income 
and gift income).18 Our findings to date suggest that increased internal research 
expenditures per faculty member are associated with increases in the student/faculty ratio, 
in faculty salaries and in undergraduate tuition levels, but that these increases are quite 
modest.  
 Our analyses, however, hold many of the sources of income coming into the 
university, including state appropriations per student, endowment income, and annual 
giving constant. Some state systems, for example the SUNY system in New York, 
                                                 
18 Ehrenberg, Rizzo and Jakubson (2002) 
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provide additional funding for institutions based upon the volume of the institutions’ 
external research funding. To the extent that institutional expenditures on research help to 
generate external research funding, our estimates of even modest effects may overstate 
the negative impact of institutional expenditures on research on students. Similarly, we 
know from the recent research that I conducted with Cornell undergraduate Christopher 
Smith on the sources and uses of annual giving, that increases in research per faculty 
member are associated with higher levels of annual giving, which gain could cause our 
estimated impacts of increases in institutional expenses on research to be too large.19 
However, when we treated changes in state appropriations and changes in annual giving 
as endogenous and dependent, in turn, on research expenditures from external funds and 
total research expenditures, and made changes in external research expenditures 
dependent on changes in institutional research expenditures, our findings were not 
significantly altered. 
It is also possible that the increasing costs of research that are borne by universities 
may be eventually at least partially offset by revenues that the universities receive from 
increased commercialization of their faculty members’ research. The Association of 
University Technology Managers (AUTM) reported in their fiscal year 2000 survey of 
their members that American colleges and universities received more than $1 billion 
dollars in licensing income and other forms of royalties relating to patents that year. 
While this figure seems large, it was concentrated in a few large “winners”; 90% of the 
                                                 
19  Ehrenberg and Smith (2003) 
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universities in their sample received less than $2 million and almost half received less 
than $1 million.20 
Licensing income received in one year depends upon the flow of investments in 
research that universities have made in the past. If we ignore this and the fact that the 
return on any particular research project may occur for a number of years in the future, a 
simple way of looking at the commercial returns that universities receive from their 
faculty members’ research is to ask how the licensing income received by a university in 
one year relates to its own expenditures on research in that year. Licensing income 
received in fiscal year 2000 averaged 3.23% of total research expenditures in the year 
across the institutions in the AUTM sample. Universities fund nearly 20% of their 
research expenditures out of their own resources, which suggests that licensing income 
averaged about 16% of institutions’ research expenditures out of internal university funds 
in the year. 
At first glance this seems like a significant return but this calculation is misleading for 
at least three reasons. First, the licensing income that universities receive is divided 
between the university and the researchers. So only a share of the revenue actually comes 
to the university itself. Second, focusing on the average ratio ignores the skewness in the 
distribution of research returns. The median institution in the sample licensing income 
was 0.83% of its total research revenue, which is about 4.2% of its internal volume of 
research expenditures. 
Third, given the volume of a university’s research, licensing income and other forms 
of revenue from patents that are related to this research do not simply fall off trees. 
                                                 
20 See Blumenstyk (2002a). Some of these large winners were universities that cashed in equity positions 
that they had taken in companies, in lieu of receiving licensing income. 
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Rather, they must be “harvested”. Considerable efforts must be made by universities and 
their faculty members to decide if faculty members’ discoveries have potential 
commercial value, to patent the discoveries, to then develop or seek partners to develop 
commercial potential, to negotiate licenses or equity positions, and to enforce patents.21 
All of these activities take resources. Indeed, the cost of trying to enforce patents alone 
can prove very expensive.22 
While no comprehensive source of data on the costs that universities occur in trying 
to generate licensing income is currently available, summary information from the 
AUTM licensing survey permits us to make some back of the envelope calculations. 
During fiscal year 2000, the 142 U.S universities in the AUTM sample employed a total 
of 479.95 “licensing” full-time equivalent employees (FTEs) and 494.53 other FTEs in 
their technology transfer offices. They also incurred $117,927,842 in legal fees, of which 
third parties reimbursed only $53,685,716.23 Hence these universities’ net legal fees for 
technology transfer activities were roughly $64 million and they employed a total of 
about 975 employees. These employees include patent attorneys, other professionals and 
support staff. If we assume that the fully loaded costs of each employee (salaries, 
benefits, office space etc.) averaged $100,000 that year, the total expenses of technology 
transfer activities for these institutions were in the range of $161.5 million dollars, or an 
average of about $1.15 million per university. 
Maintaining the assumption that the average fully loaded cost of each employee was 
$100,000; the AUTM survey responses allow us to compute an estimate of the net 
                                                 
21 Thursby and Thursby (2000) describe this process in much more detail and provide estimates of licensing 
production functions. 
22 The University of Rochester has established an “eight figure” legal fund in its effort to obtain billions of 
dollars in royalties from the makers and marketers of the arthritis drug Celebrex (Blumenstyck 2002b).  
23 Association of University Technology Managers (2001), attachment D 
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licensing income (income after expenses) for 138 of the universities in the sample. The 
mean net licensing income in this sample was $6,554,200, but the median was only 
$343,952. By my calculations 51 of the 138 institutions actually lost income that year on 
their commercialization activities and the median net licensing income for the 87 that 
made money was $1,309,828. When one remembers that the licensing income received 
by universities is split between them and the faculty members whose patents have 
generated the income, it seems clear that commercialization of research has yet to provide 
most universities with large amounts of net income to support the universities’ scientific 
research activities. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
  Permit me to conclude with some speculations about the future of higher 
education as we move into the 21st century. First, it is clear that public higher education 
institutions will continue to look more and more like private institutions. Lack of state 
funding is forcing many to move towards higher tuition policies in an effort to maintain 
their quality.  While most economists applaud high tuition policies for public higher 
education institutions, they have tended to do so under the assumption that states, or the 
institutions out of their own resources, would provide need-based financial aid to allow 
lower-income students to attend these institutions. However, state and federal funding of 
financial aid is moving more and more towards merit aid, not towards need based aid, 
and in the main public institutions are not generating large amounts of income that can be 
used for need based aid from their tuition increases –they are simply trying to make up 
for state appropriations cuts. So reduced access to our four-year public institutions for 
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students from lower-income families is likely to occur and we are likely to see more and 
more lower-income students starting their college careers at cheaper (for them) public 
two-year institutions. 
 This trend will increase the importance of state policy makers more seriously 
thinking about their public higher education systems as a whole. Efforts will be needed to 
improve the transition of students from 2-year colleges into 4-year colleges and to 
develop a better understanding of which state policies facilitate such transitions. Efforts 
will be needed to help understand why within states some 2-year colleges are better at 
preparing their students who desire to transfer to 4-year institutions to successfully 
complete the 4-year colleges and why some 4-year colleges in a state do better jobs 
educating transfer students than other 4-year colleges. Chris Smith and I have done some 
preliminary work on this problem. 24 
 The growing financial problems of public higher education institutions have 
pushed them to look more like private academic institutions in another way, namely 
increasing their reliance on private giving and endowment income to fund current 
operations.  Giving from corporations, foundations and alumni rarely comes without 
strings and as their efforts to generate more giving increase, public higher education 
institutions will increasingly find that they have to be careful what they ask for. Put 
perhaps slightly differently, the growing interrelationship between universities and 
external constituents is likely to lead to whole sets of issues concerning how the goals of 
the universities mesh with the goals of the funders. 
 Science and engineering research will continue to grow in importance and costs. 
Some institutions have already realized that they do not have the resources that are 
                                                 
24 Ehrenberg and Smith (2002) 
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needed to compete and have reduced their aspirations and financial commitments. For 
example, Clark and Catholic universities have both “voluntarily” dropped out of the 
Association of American Universities. Others, especially emerging public universities, 
such as the University Centers of the State University of New York, however, are 
actively involved in the arms race of spending for science and engineering research and 
in doing so have moved away from their traditional missions of providing quality 
undergraduate education. It is ironic that the turn of the 21st century sees the great private 
and public research universities reemphasizing the importance of undergraduate 
education, while some of the emerging publics, by financial necessity, are moving in the 
opposite direction. 
 Finally, the evolution of the public higher education institutions will, to a large 
extent, be determined by the financial incentives that their state budget allocation process 
provide. The majority of states have some form of formula funding and/or performance 
funding as part of their resource allocation process.25 For example, in New York State, 
the SUNY schools now get financial rewards for generating external research funding 
and for expanding their enrollments relative to the rest of the system. They also get larger 
rewards for enrolling upper class students and graduate students than from enrolling 
lower level undergraduates. This resource allocation model surely does not encourage the 
development of high quality lower-level undergraduate education. Rather it encourages, 
the use of adjuncts and teacher assistants to teach lower level courses. Developing 
funding allocation models that do not provide incentives for participants to try to “game 
the system” is very difficult and thus strong academic leadership at the center of state 
                                                 
25 MGT of America (2001) 
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systems appears to be a valuable, but often ignored, commodity in the planning for the 
evolution of public higher education. 
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Figure 1 
Average Share of Total State Expenditures on Education 
50 U.S. States, FY74-FY02
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Figure 2 
Average State General Fund Higher Education Appropriations per 
Total State Education Budgets 50 U.S. States, FY74-FY02
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Figure 3 
Average Share of State Higher Education Expenditures to Students 
in form of Need Based and Non-Need Based Grant Aid, FY77-
FY01
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Figure 4 
Real State Appropriations to Higher Education per Public Student 
(total headcount) 1974AY-2000AY
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Figure  5 
 
Associate Professor Continuation Rates 
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Figure 6 
Variance of Log-Salary of Full Professors 
at Research 1 Institutions, 1963-2001
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Figure 7 
Variance of Log-Salary of Ranked Faculty at Liberal 
Arts Colleges,1963-1998
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                                           Table 1 
Average Mean Start-Up Costs for Departments Reporting in the Category* 
ents Reporting) 
 Pri Public 
(Number of Departm
 
   R1 Other R1 Other 
vate Private Public 
AA PHY 353,905(3) 77,750(8) 311,842(15) 140,958(24) 
AA IO (7) (18) (24) (31) B 371,857 179,056 306,750 180,710
AA CHEM  )475,294(17) 202,352(17 466,560(28) 211,020(50) 
AA ENG 337,000(11) )140,014(14 192,840(30) 118,906(35) 
HA PHY 563,444(9) 254,071(14) 481,176(41) 248,777(47) 
HA BIO 437,917 (12) 208,886(22) 430,270(37) 217,082(49) 
HA CHEM 580,000(17) 259,348(23) 584,250(40) 284,269(60) 
HA ENG 416,875(16) 209,57(21) 259,494(50) 146,831(43) 
AP PHY 596,875(4) 80,000(1) 748,274(15) 324,375(16) 
AP BIO 750,000(3) 475,000(9) 573,438(16) 369,545(22) 
AP CHEM 991,667(12) 612,857(7) 833,571(21) 568,462(26) 
AP ENG 1,500,000(6) 226,667(9) 391,528(30) 202,038(19) 
HP PHY 1,000,000(4) 418,333(3) 1,110,577(24) 455,882(17) 
HP BIO 1,575,000(5) 555,500(10) 856,250(16) 709,444(27) 
HP CHEM 1,172,222(9) 575,000(8) 1,187,115(26) 648,913(23) 
HP ENG 1,807,143(7) 452,000(10) 472,086(34) 254,597(23) 
* Tab
Surve
u  e h es e 
y -  L pa u ailed 
o rs l e, nce ing 
d 02 
 
AA  average start-up costs for new assistant professors 
h-end start-up costs for new assistant professors 
P  average start-up costs for senior faculty 
HEM chemistry 
 
lation of
 of Start
responses to th
Up Costs and
 Cornell Hig
aboratory S
er Education R
ce Allocation R
earch Institut
les that was m
 3 t  5 chai of selected bio ogical scienc  physical scie  and engineerto
epartments at each research and doctoral university during the summer of 20
Where 
 
HA  hig
A
HP  high end start-up costs for senior faculty 
 
PHY     physics and astronomy 
BIO      biology 
C
ENG     engineering 
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